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I. Introduction
Philip F. Postlewaite is the Harry Horrow Professor in Interna-
tional Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Stephanie
R. Hoffer is an Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State Univer-
sity, Moritz College of Law. Matthew T. Kemp is a law student
at Northwestern University School of Law (expectedJ.D. 2009).
Hybrid business entities-treated as conduits that are
fiscally transparent in one country but as separate
entities that are fiscally opaque in another-create
challenges of treaty interpretation when their income
crosses international borders. The basic difficulty
in such cases is that the countries of source and
residence disagree on whether the entity itself or its
members are taxable on such income. Accordingly,
with regard to treaty benefits, this divergent treatment
may lead to double taxation or double nontaxation.
The extensive network of bilateral tax treaties entered
into by the United States, almost without exception,
addresses partnerships and other transparent enti-
ties. Only recently has the language of the treaties
begun to deal explicitly with issues generated by
hybrid entities.
The current popularity of hybrid entities is due
largely to the "check-the-box" (C-T-B) regulations'
adopted by the United States a decade ago. They
provide a relatively easy method for creating hybrid
structures.' Under the C-T-B regulations, an entity
that is engaged in business and not a per se cor-
poration is an "eligible entity." A per se corporation
under the regulations includes any domestic enter-
prise that has incorporated under state or federal law
and any foreign entity enumerated in the regulations
in 80 specified foreign jurisdictions.'
An eligible entity with two or more members may
elect to be classified and taxed either as a partner-
ship or as an association taxable as a corporation.4
Such an entity with only one member may elect to be
classified as an association taxable as a corporation
or to be disregarded and taxed to its owner as a sole
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proprietor or as a branch., In either case, the own-
ers of an electing entity may obtain a single level of
tax rather than the two-level tax of the corporation/
shareholder format.6 If the entity does not make an
affirmative election as to its tax classification, its tax
classification is determined under default provisions.7
The default provisions basically favor noncorporate




classification in the domestic context and corporate
classification in the foreign context.
Under these rules, there are four logical hybrid
structures from the perspective of the United States
that can arise: (1) a domestic regular hybrid entity
(formed in the United States, treated as a transparent
partnership by the United States and as an opaque,
separate entity by the foreign treaty partner) (see Dia-
gram 1); (2) a foreign regular hybrid entity (formed
outside the United States, treated as transparent by
the United States and as opaque by the foreign treaty
partner) (see Diagram 2); (3) a domestic reverse
hybrid entity (formed in the United States, treated
as a separate entity by the United States but as
transparent by the foreign treaty
partner) (see Diagram 3); and
(4) a foreign reverse hybrid en-
Partner LI] tity (formed outside the United
States, treated as a separate
entity by the United States andSStates as transparent by the foreign
treaty partner) (see Diagram 4).
In each of the diagrams above, a
triangle represents a transparent
entity, and a rectangle repre-
sents an opaque entity.
This article will examine the
distinct approaches that the United States has taken
when determining the treaty eligibility of the four
categories of hybrid entities described above. Part
II will consider these approaches in general terms
and will compare them with positions adopted in
the OECD model commentary and the recently ad-
opted United States Model Treaty. Part III will present
a more detailed description of
the four approaches, as well as
a description of the Code Sec.
894 regulations applicable to
hybrid entities. Part IV will pro-
vide working examples of each
approach as typified by the U.S.-
Barbados treaty, the U.S.-United
Kingdom treaty, the U.S.-Japan
and the U.S.-Canada treaty. Part
V will conclude that while U.S.
tax treatment of hybrid entities
ty Partner L- has become clearer and more
--------------- effective in recent years, there
ed States is still room for improvement.
Treaty language could provide
a greater level of detail, and
the harmonization of hybrid entity provisions across
treaties would provide additional certainty to both
domestic and foreign investors.
II. Regulatory and Model
Approaches to Treaty Eligibility
of Hybrid Entities
The general approach of the United States to hybrid
entities is captured in the Code Sec. 894 regulations.
As hybrid entities began to proliferate, the IRS and
the Treasury addressed the issue of treaty benefits for
passive income through the introduction of specific
34








rules in the regulations. As it frequently takes years
to renegotiate a tax treaty or to enter a protocol, the
regulations offered a quick solution, provided that
the foreign taxpayer or his legal advisor was aware
of their existence and of the pro-taxpayer results that
they typically generate. Unfortunately, this unilateral
approach is of little value to domestic taxpayers
engaged in passive foreign investment through hy-
brid structures because the availability of the Code
Sec. 894 regulations is conditioned upon the treaty
partner affording similar treatment.8 Although the
regulations presume reciprocity in the absence of a
public notice or mutual agreement with the treaty
partner, there is no time limitation upon the treaty
partner's actions in this regard.9 In other words, inves-
tors cannot rely upon the lack of such a notice, as
one may come at any time. The regulations specify
that once the IRS has alerted taxpayers to a lack of
reciprocity, the treaty benefits formerly ensured by
the regulations will be denied.loThis limitation upon
the applicability of the regulations introduces both




investment. Although the tax
policy trajectories of some for-
eign treaty partners are clear, it
goes without saying that others
are not. In those instances, the
Code Sec. 894 regulations may
provide little comfort.
The general rule advanced by
the regulations is that an entity
organized in a foreign country
can only claim treaty benefits
on the receipt of U.S.-source
passive income if the entity
is considered a "resident" of
that country for tax purposes
(i.e., the entity is not transpar-
ent). If the entity is treated as
transparent by that country,
its members may claim treaty
benefits if they are subject to tax
on that income as "residents"
of the foreign treaty partner.
The tax laws of the state in
ty Partner / which the entities or members
claiming treaty benefits reside
ed States - are controlling, even though
the income is sourced in the
United States.
The regulations are generally in accord with the
approach taken by the U.S. Model Treaty and the
OECD Model Treaty and Commentary." As a mat-
ter of outcomes, the OECD and the United States
have adopted similar approaches to the question
of hybrid entities. The OECD's 1999 Partnership
Report addressed the problems of double taxation
and double nontaxation arising from two sources:
different classifications given to the same entity by
the states of source and residence, and different tax
treatment given by the states of source and residence
despite similar classification of the entity in ques-
tion.12 Rather than approach the problem of hybrid
entities as one requiring additional treaty drafting in
the wake of the U.S. C-T-B regulations, the OECD
chose an interpretive approach. In accordance with
the Partnership Report, it revised the Model Treaty
Commentary, but it did not add or remove provisions
from the Model Treaty itself.
The OECD Report observed that eligibility for
treaty benefits under Article One of the Model
Treaty depends upon residence in one of the con-
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tracting states.13 Residence, in turn, is described
by Article Four, which provides that a resident is a
person who is liable for tax in a contracting state
by reason of domicile, residence, place of man-
agement or similar criteria.1 4 The Report reasoned
that if the state of residence views an entity as
fiscally transparent, the entity is not liable for tax
and therefore cannot be a resident for purposes of
Article 4. In other words, whether a source state af-
fords treaty benefits to an entity is determined with
reference to the residence state's characterization
of the entity."5 The source state's characterization
is irrelevant; therefore, applicability of the Model
Treaty to hybrid entities is unambiguous.
The U.S. approach produces an identical result in
almost all instances, but rather than merely relying
upon an updated interpretation of existing treaties,
the United States has recently sought to solidify its
position within the language of the treaties them-
selves.16 Article 1, clause 6 of the U.S. Model Treaty
provides the following:
An item of income, profit or gain derived through
an entity that is fiscally transparent under the laws
of either Contracting
State shall be consid-
ered to be derived by The general rul
a resident of a State to
the extent that the item regulations is that
is treated for purposes of in a foreign corn
the taxation law of such treaty benefits on
Contracting State as the
income, profit or gain of source passive ii
a resident.' 7  is considered a
In other words, like country for tax
the OECD commentary, entity is no
the U.S. Model Treaty
provision looks to the
characterization of the state of residence when deter-
mining the treaty eligibility of hybrid entities. Similar
language has been incorporated into a number of
existing U.S. conventions, including but not limited to
recent agreements with Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Belgium and Sweden.",
Unlike the new Model Treaty, the partnership
provisions of most older bilateral tax treaties,' 9 i.e.,
those predating the C-T-B regulations, are arguably
uncertain in their application. Given the dearth of
hybrid structures when these treaties were entered
into, it is difficult, if not impossible, to intuit how the
treaty drafters would have applied the partnership and
corporate provisions of the treaty to current, more
advanced business structures.20 More modern treaties
depart slightly from the older treaties with new textual
language that appears to expand the scope of the pro-
vision beyond traditional partnerships, i.e., to limited
liability companies and the like. This expanded scope
is more susceptible to application to hybrid structures.
In addition, some of the accompanyingTechnical Ex-
planations to these treaties contain text and examples
dealing explicitly with hybrid entities.21 Finally, given
the omnipresence of hybrid structures, treaties in
recent years have adopted the Model approach and
now possess actual text that clearly addresses tax is-
sues arising in the hybrid context.
U.S. tax treaties can be grouped into four main
categories with regard to their application to hybrid
entities, each of which is described below. Three of
them embrace the rule that the tax laws of the country
of residence control the determination of treaty eligi-
bility. These three categories are illustrated by the U.S.
tax treaties with Barbados ("partnerships"), the United
Kingdom ("person that is fiscally transparent") and Ja-
pan ("without regard to whether the income is treated
e advanced by the
an entity organized
itry can only claim
the receipt of U.S.-




as the income of such ...
members ... under the tax
laws of the first mentioned
Contracting State"), respec-
tively. The U.S.-Barbados
treaty illustrates the part-
nership language found
mainly in older treaties.
The more modern U.S.-
United Kingdom treaty
adheres to the principles
of the traditional approach,
but the wording of the text
is broadened through the
use of the term "fiscally
transparent" entities, which includes passthrough enti-
ties such as limited liability companies. The U.S.-Japan
tax treaty contains a detailed provision addressing
hybrid entities specifically, by prescribing precise rules
for the determination of whether and when an income
item is eligible for treaty benefits when the transaction
involves a hybrid entity. The fourth category, which may
deny treaty benefits to persons who receive income
from hybrid entity payors, is exemplified by a recent
and unique Protocol to the U.S.-Canada treaty. 2
Despite the variant language employed by the
Code Sec. 894 regulations, Barbados, United
S<1I-'
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Kingdom and Japan approaches to the issue, each
approach shares an underlying premise: either the
entity or its members must be taxable residents of
a treaty country before an item of income will be
eligible for treaty benefits. It is worth noting, though,
that while these differing approaches should be inter-
preted consistently when applied to varying hybrid
entity scenarios, the lack of specificity in older trea-
ties, such as the Barbados treaty, produces less than
perfect certainty. Finally, one other feature shared
by the Code Sec. 894 regulations and all U.S. tax
treaties is the preservation of a country's right to tax
its own residents or citizens notwithstanding other
regulations or other provisions of the treaty.2 3 This
right is lodged in the Saving Clause of the applicable
treaty. In the case of domestic reverse hybrid entities,




1. Code Sec. 894 Regulations
The Code Sec. 894 regulations outline the general
rule that passive income received by a transparent
entity is eligible for treaty benefits only if the entity
or its members are considered residents of a country
that is party to a tax treaty. They instruct:
The tax imposed ... on an item of income received
by an entity, wherever organized, that is fiscally
transparent under the laws of the United States
and/or any other jurisdiction with respect to an
item of income shall be eligible for reduction
under the terms of an income tax treaty to which
the United States is a party only if the item of
income is derived by a resident of the applicable
treaty jurisdiction.14
If the country of residence treats the entity as
transparent, the members, if resident therein, will
be eligible for treaty benefits. If the members are
nonresidents, the income is ineligible for the benefits
of the treaty with that particular country (although it
may be eligible for the benefits of a different treaty).
The regulations are applicable in any treaty context
unless the treaty specifically addresses hybrid entities
and provides for different treatment.25
As the Preamble to the regulations recognizes,
the concept of fiscal transparency "is critical to the
determination of whether an item of income is de-
rived by an entity or an interest holder in an entity."26
Accordingly, paragraph (d)(3)(ii) of the regulations
determines whether an entity is fiscally transparent
in the entity's jurisdiction, and paragraph (d)(3)(iii)
determines whether the entity is fiscally transparent
in the interest holder's jurisdiction. The entity jurisdic-
tion rule of (d)(3)(ii) applies to any "person" that is not
treated as an individual by either treaty jurisdiction,
including disregarded entities.27 The rule specifies
that an entity is fiscally transparent with respect to an
item of income if the laws of the entity's jurisdiction
require its interest holders to account for the income
item separately, whether or not it is distributed. 28
In addition, an entity will not be transparent with
respect to an item of income under the regulations
unless the entity's jurisdiction characterizes the item
of income as though the interest holders derived it
directly from the payor.2 9 Furthermore, an entity will
only be considered to be fiscally transparent in the
interest holder's jurisdiction with respect to an item
of income if the jurisdiction characterizes the item
as though it were derived by the interest holder.30 For
purposes of this determination, "it is irrelevant how
the entity is treated under the laws of the entity's
jurisdiction."" These definitions are crucial to the
operation of the regulations: entities that are fiscally
transparent are not entitled to treaty benefits, but their
non-transparent interest holders may be.32
The regulations provide different treatment for
domestic reverse hybrid entities, i.e., organized
in the United States, considered fiscally opaque
by the United States, but treated as transparent
by another country:
An income tax treaty may not apply to reduce
the amount of federal income tax on U.S. source
payments received by a domestic reverse hybrid
entity. Further, notwithstanding paragraph (d)(1)
of this section, the foreign interest holders of a
domestic reverse hybrid entity are not entitled
to the benefits of a reduction of U.S. income tax
under an income tax treaty on items of income
received from U.S. sources by such entity.33
Thus, even though the treaty partner country may
tax the income to its resident beneficiaries, the United
States is not required to grant treaty benefits. This is
because the entity is a taxable U.S. corporation.
The Code Sec. 894 regulations relate only to passive
income, i.e., "U.S. source income that is not effec-
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tively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or
business."34 They do not address business profits. The
Preamble to the regulations fails to provide an ex-
planation for this limitation. The IRS and theTreasury
have seemingly decided to postpone the resolution
of the issue and to deal separately with this matter
at the appropriate time.
2. Traditional "Partnership"
Language: U.S.-Barbados Treaty
Most older tax treaties do not explicitly address hybrid
entities. The U.S.-Barbados treaty contains a "partner-
ship" provision, typifying the language used in the
residency article of older treaties.3 It specifies that a"partnership, estate or trust" is a resident of the United
States "only to the extent that the income derived by
such partnership, estate or trust is subject to United
States tax as income of a resident, either in its hands or
in the hands of its partners or beneficiaries."36 The treaty
is silent with regard to other transparent or hybrid enti-
ties. It is a near certainty that the older treaties, such as
the Barbados treaty, did not contemplate the problems
posed by hybrid entities as they were entered prior to
the promulgation of the C-T-B regulations. However,
by linking treaty benefits to residency requirements,
these partnership provisions appear to reach the same
result as the Code Sec. 894 regulations.
Under the U.S.-Barbados treaty, in order for an
entity to claim benefits on U.S. source income, the
taxpayer must be a resident "subject to tax" in Bar-
bados; therefore, it cannot be fiscally transparent. If
the entity is fiscally transparent, its members can only
claim treaty benefits if they are residents "subject
to tax" in Barbados. This is precisely the outcome
that occurs under the Code Sec. 894 regulations.
The Barbados treaty does not explicitly provide that
the tax law of the United States, as the source coun-
try, is irrelevant in determining fiscal transparency.
Nevertheless, the basic inquiry is whether Barbados,
as the residence country, will tax the entity or its
members. The answer to this question determines
whether and to whom the United States will grant
treaty benefits.
The older Technical Explanations, such as that for
the Barbados treaty, also fail to address the applica-
tion of the residency provisions to hybrid entities.
Thus, the Code Sec. 894 regulations are central to the
resolution of the proper treatment. While Barbados
investment in the United States through hybrid struc-
tures has the benefit of the "better of" approach (treaty
or domestic law) provided one is fully informed, U.S.
investment in Barbados is uncertain unless similar
provisions exist under Barbados domestic law.
Interestingly, notwithstanding the evolution of
treaty specification to changing business forms, i.e.,
partnership to fiscally transparent to hybrid entity, a
few treaties negotiated in the past decade have clung
to this traditional "partnership" language rather than
upgrade to the descriptive term, "fiscally transparent"
entity. However, some of the accompanyingTechn ical
Explanations address the issue and provide additional
guidance. For example, the Technical Explanation to
the U.S.-Latvia treaty, signed in 1998, which contains
a partnership residency provision virtually identi-
cal to that of the Barbados treaty, provides that the
characterization of an entity in the source country or
in a third country is "irrelevant, even if the entity is
organized in that third country."37The only character-
ization that matters is that of the residence country of
the person (whether an entity or a member) claiming
the treaty benefits.
Finally, as with the modern treaties, the Saving
Clause of older treaties would deny benefits to
domestic reverse hybrid entities, because they are
taxable entities resident in the source state."
3. Modem "Fiscally Transparent
Entity" Language: U.S.-United
Kingdom Treaty
The U.S.-United Kingdom tax treaty, signed in 2001,
contains the "modern" version of the residency provi-
sion for conduit enterprises:
An item of income, profit or gain derived through
a person that is fiscally transparent under the laws
of either Contracting State shall be considered to
be derived by a resident of a Contracting State to
the extent that the item is treated for the purposes
of the taxation law of such Contracting State as
the income, profit or gain of a resident) 9
This language is virtually identical to a comparable
provision contained in the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty,40
and it modifies the language of the "partnership"
provisions of older treaties in two ways. First, the
"partnership, estate, or trust" language has been re-
placed by the broader, more modern phrase "person
that is fiscally transparent." Second, the provision
refers to the laws of "either Contracting State."
The Technical Explanations of both the Model and
United Kingdom treaties explain that a fiscally trans-
38
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parent entity is one that is "not subject to tax at the
entity level, as distinct from entities that are subject
to tax, but with respect to which tax may be relieved
under an integrated system." 41 Accordingly, the new
"fiscally transparent" entity language encompasses a
broader range of entities, including limited liability
companies,42 than the original language, which, if read
literally, might limit the provision's application only to"partnerships." However, theTechnical Explanations of
many of the older treaties refer to "fiscally transparent
entities such as partnerships" and specifically provide
that the term "partnership" also applies "to U.S. limited
liability companies (LLCs) that are treated as partner-
ships for U.S. tax purposes."43 Thus, at least from the
perspective of the United States, the provisions of the
older treaties conceivably apply to income earned
through anytransparent entity. If so, the new language
would not substantively change the operation of the
treaty. However, because Technical Explanations are
not binding on the other treaty signatory,44 it is possible
for treaty partners to apply the "partnership, estate, or
trust" language literally. For instance, Canada did not
recognize U.S. limited liability companies as partner-
ships for treaty purposes until the conclusion of the
most recent Protocol to the treaty in September 2007. 41
Thus, the new "fiscally transparent" language embed-
ded in the treaty itself provides additional certainty
regarding the qualification for tax treaty benefits.
The effect of including the word "either" in the
United Kingdom treaty-if indeed there is any
effect-is unclear. Commentators have suggested
that the treaty gives both countries more flexibility in
determining whether an entity is fiscally transparent. 46
Strangely, this conclusion does not appear to follow
from the text of the provision itself. Textually, if the
United States is the source country, treaty benefits
will arise only if either the entity or its members are
United Kingdom residents. The "either" does not add
anything of substance, but merely confirms that the
rule applies to entities organized in either country and
to income that flows in either direction.47The crux of
the provision is that entitlement to treaty benefits is
pinned to satisfaction of the residency requirements.
Accordingly, only the tax laws of the country of resi-
dence should be controlling.41 It is uncertain whether
these provisions are broader than Code Sec. 894 and
apply to active as well as passive income.
TheTechnical Explanation to the U.S.-United King-
dom treaty provides several examples affirming the
view that entitlement to treaty benefits is tied to the
tax law of the country of residence. This discussion
is then followed by a paragraph that seems to deny
any flexible treatment by the source country:
The same result obtains even if the entity were
viewed differently under the tax laws of the
[source country]. Similarly, the characterization
of the entity in a third country is also irrelevant,
even if the entity is organized in that third coun-
try. The results follow regardless of whether the
entity is disregarded as a separate entity under
the laws of one jurisdiction but not the other,
such as a single owner entity that is viewed as a
branch for U.S. tax purposes and as a corporation
for U.K. tax purposes. These results also obtain
regardless of where the entity is organized (i.e.,
in the United States, in the United Kingdom, or,
as noted above, in a third country).49
The United Kingdom treaty also employs a Saving
Clause.50 The Diplomatic Notes to the treaty, which
seem to be the source of claims of greater flexibility
due to the term "either" in this particular treaty,5
merely confirm the operation of the Saving Clause.
Thus, the United States, as the source country, need
not defer to the United Kingdom's tax laws as long
as the income is derived by a person or entity tax-
able as a U.S. citizen or resident. An exception to the
general rule applies when both countries can claim
that income is derived by a residentY
4. Detailed Treatment of Hybrid
Entities: U.S.-Japan Treaty
The 2003 tax treaty between Japan and the United States
was the first to contain a more comprehensive provision
dealing with hybrid entities."3 The provision adheres to
the general rule that the source country should defer
to the tax laws of the residence country. However,
instead of simply stating this rule (as do other treaties),
the provision details the application of treaty benefits
to transparent entities in five different settings. For con-
venience, we have characterized the United States as
the source country in our description below.
Subparagraph (a) of Article 4, paragraph 6 provides
that U.S. source income derived through a fiscally
transparent Japanese entity is only eligible for treaty
benefits if the members of the enterprise are Japanese
residents.14 The last clause is determinative: "without
regard to whether the income is treated as the income
of such beneficiaries, members or participants under
the tax laws of the first-mentioned Contracting State."
Assuming that the "first-mentioned Contracting State"
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is the United States, the treatment of the entity under
U.S. tax laws is irrelevant in determining whether the
income is eligible for treaty benefits.
Subparagraph (b) provides that if Japan treats the
entity as fiscally opaque/non-transparent, the entity
itself is entitled to treaty benefits on the U.S. source
income, even if the United States considers the en-
terprise to be transparent.5 Subparagraph (c) provides
that Japanese members of an entity treated as fiscally
transparent under Japanese law and organized in a
third country are eligible for treaty benefits on U.S.
source income.56 The treatment of the entity by the
United States or the host third country is irrelevant.
As long as Japan considers the entity to be transparent
(and therefore taxes the income to its resident mem-
bers), the members are eligible for treaty benefits.
Subparagraphs (d)"7 and (e)58 describe situations
in which no treaty benefits are available. In sub-
paragraph (d), Japan treats a third-country entity as
fiscally opaque. Accordingly, Japan will not tax the
U.S. source income because the entity is not a resident
of Japan. Furthermore, given the Japanese treatment
of the entity as non-transparent, the members will
not be subjected to current taxation on the entity's
receipt of the income. Accordingly, treaty benefits are
not available. Denying benefits under the U.S.-Japan
treaty makes sense in this
situation because neither
the entity nor the member The only char
is subject to tax in Japan. matters is that
Of course, the entity may country of the
be able to claim benefits
under its host country's entity or a men
tax treaty with the United treaty
States, if any, so long as
the Limitation on Benefits
Clause does not prevent it.
Subparagraph (e) shifts from an entity organized in
a third country to one that is organized in the United
States. The entity is treated as fiscally transparent by
the United States, but Japan still considers the entity
to be opaque. As in subparagraph (d), Japan does not
tax any of the members on the income. The entity
is not a resident of Japan, and thus the U.S. source
income is not taxed by Japan. Therefore, the income
is not eligible for treaty benefits at either the entity
level or the member level.
These provisions do not add substantively to the
general rule of deference to the residence country's
definition of the entity. These same results can be






found in other treaties. Indeed, the Treasury's Techni-
cal Explanation of the U.S.-Japan treaty states, "These
results are consistent with provisions addressing fis-
cally transparent entities in recent U.S. treaties and
with U.S. domestic law pursuant to Regulations under
section 894(c)."5 9 However, they improve the clarity
and certainty of the treaty's application and dramati-
cally increase accessibility of the information.
Domestic reverse hybrid entities (treated as opaque
in the United States but transparent by Japan) are not
addressed by Article 4(6). Because such entities are
by definition "residents" of the source state, they fall
within the treaty's Saving Clause, which permits each
state to tax its citizens or residents notwithstanding
other provisions of the treaty.60 This clause effectively
denies treaty benefits to reverse domestic hybrids, an
approach which is consistent with the Code Sec. 894
regulations and other modern treaties.
5. Denial of Benefits to Members of
Hybrid Entities: U.S.-Canada Treaty
The most recent Protocol to the Convention between
the United States of America and Canada with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and on Capital ("Canada
treaty") was concluded on September 21, 2007,
after nearly a decade of negotiation.61 It represents
a change in the treat-
ment of hybrid structures
terization that in cross-border transac-
f the residence tions involving the United
States' single largest trad-ing partner. Under the
er) claiming the Protocol, treaty benefits
inefits. are explicitly denied to
residents of one contract-
ing state who receive
income, gain or profit from a hybrid entity that is a
resident of the other contracting state. 62 Commenta-
tors have speculated that the Protocol's anti-hybrid
provisions are aimed at particular structures per-
ceived as abusive by the two governments; however,
the scope of the Protocol's plain language is much
broader than the targeted transactions. 63
Prior to adoption of the Protocol, Canada did
not recognize United States limited liability
companies as partnerships for treaty purposes. 64
To remedy this unfavorable situation, Article 2 of
the Protocol has added two sections to the treaty's
residence provision; the first creates a favorable
rule for fiscally transparent entities such as limited
liability companies, and the second creates an
/ (1\
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unfavorable exception for many hybrid entities.61
The general rule, which will be found in Article
IV, paragraph 6 of the integrated treaty, provides
that an item of income is derived by a resident of
the United States if three requirements are satis-
fied. First, the person claiming treaty benefits
must be considered to have derived the income
through an entity that is fiscally transparent un-
der the laws of the United States.66 Second, the
fiscally transparent entity must not be a resident
of Canada.6 7 Finally, the U.S. tax laws must treat
the income derived through the entity in the same
manner as if it had been derived directly by the
person who is claiming treaty benefits .6 Under
this rule, Canada must recognize members of
U.S. passthrough entities who pay United States
income tax as residents of the United States who
are eligible for treaty benefits.
Article 2 of the Protocol, which will amend Ar-
ticle IV of the treaty, creates a striking exception
to the generally favorable rule. It provides that
"[an amount of income, profit or gain shall be
considered not to be paid to or derived by a person
who is a resident of a Contracting State" in two
situations. First, income will be deemed not to be
paid to a resident if it passes through an entity that
is classified as fiscally transparent by the country
of source but which is treated as opaque by the
country of residence.69 Second, income received
from a source country resident will be deemed not
to be paid to a resident if it passes through an entity
that the country of source classifies as opaque, but
which the country of residence perceives as fis-
cally transparent.70The result in the first instance is
consistent with the United States' approach under
the Barbados, United Kingdom and Japan treaties
because the denial of treaty benefits is based upon
the classification of the hybrid entity in the coun-
try of residence. Because the country of residence
will not directly tax the members, but rather, will
focus its attention on the hybrid entity, the country
of source need not cede its jurisdiction over the
members. In this instance, because the potential
for double-taxation of the members does not exist,
they need no recourse to treaty benefits. Finally, it is
worth noting that the Protocol does not deny treaty
benefits to the entity itself, although the Limitation
on Benefits Clause may apply in some cases.
The second situation described by the Canada
Protocol is less intuitive when compared to the
content of other U.S. treaties. Article 2(7)(b) of
the Protocol specifies that income will be deemed
not to be paid to a resident if it is paid by a source
country entity that the country of source classifies
as opaque, but which the country of residence
perceives as fiscally transparent resulting in a dif-
ference in tax treatment between the two countries.
The Barbados, United Kingdom and Japan treaties,
in contrast, focus primarily upon hybrid payees
rather than hybrid payors. Although we do not deal
at length with the difficulty presented by hybrid
payors, we note that Article 2(7)(b) should prove
to be an effective government weapon against the
improper use of disregarded entities in Canadian
cross-border transactions.
IV. Examples Applying the
Hybrid Entity Provisions
From the discussion above, it is apparent that most
treaties involving the United States do not employ
the term "hybrid entity." Nevertheless, as suggested,
most are literally susceptible to an interpretation
that is consistent with the text of the Code Sec. 894
regulations and, unless specified to the contrary, the
"better of" rule of domestic law pursuant to Code
Sec. 894 will apply.
The following scenarios illustrate the applica-
tion of these principles in a variety of hybrid
entity situations. The initial examples involve two
countries: the source country (the United States)
and the treaty partner country in which the entity
and the members reside. Thereafter, more complex
settings are examined involving three countries:
the source country (the United States), the country
in which the entity is organized (treaty country
#1), and the country in which some of the entity's
members reside (treaty country #2).71 Each scenario
described below is accompanied by a diagram in
which a triangle represents a transparent entity
and a rectangle represents an opaque entity. A
small triangle or rectangle underneath the words
"United States" indicates how the source country
treats the entity.
Each country characterizes the entity as either
opaque or transparent. For each scenario, the is-
sue is whether the United States, as the source
country, must grant treaty benefits to the entity, its
members, both or neither. We consider the results
arising under the Code Sec. 894 regulations and
the four basic types of treaty provisions described
above: (1) those of the traditional Barbados treaty,
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Diagram 5. Scenario 1
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(2) the modern United Kingdom treaty, (3) the
highly specific Japan treaty, and (4) the Canada
Protocol, which explicitly denies benefits to the
members of many hybrid entities.
1. Scenario 1-United States
Classifies the Entity As Transparent;
Treaty Partner Classifies the Entity
As Opaque
Code Sec. 894 Regulations. Under Reg. §1.894-1 (d)
(1), the entity is a foreign regular hybrid that is eligible
for treaty benefits. The members, however, are not
eligible for benefits. Because the entity is a resident of
the treaty partner, it is treated as opaque and thus tax-
able. Accordingly, "the item of income is derived by a
resident of the applicable treaty jurisdiction."72 Subject
to the Limitation on Benefits Clause, treaty benefits
are available to the resident entity which will be taxed
currently on the income, and no income is derived
by the members under the law of the treaty partner.
The entity may claim treaty benefits even though the
United States treats the entity as transparent.
Barbados. The same result should obtain under
Article 4, paragraph 1(b) of the Barbados treaty.
The entity, and not the members, is "subject to
tax" by the treaty partner. If the enterprise is an
LLC, some uncertainty exists. However, barring
provisions to the contrary under Barbados law, the
Code Sec. 894 regulations should be applicable
as well.
United Kingdom. The same
result obtains under Article
1, paragraph 8 of the United
Kingdom treaty. Although the
treaty does not employ the term
"hybrid entity," the Technical
Explanation specifies that hy-
brid entities should be treated
similarly to other fiscally trans-
-- Treaty Partner parent enterprises. The U.S.
source payments are treated "as
/ United States the income, profit, or gain of a
resident" of the treaty partner.
Given the intent of the treaty
to govern hybrid entities, the
regulations are not as important
in resolving the issue.
Japan. The same result obtains
under Article 4, paragraph 6(b)
of the Japan treaty, which ex-
plicitly provides that the entity in this scenario will
be eligible for treaty benefits, even though the United
States treats the entity as transparent. However, the
members are not eligible for treaty benefits under
Article 4, paragraph 6(a), because the payments are
income to the entity, not to the members.
Canada. Under Article 2(7)(a) of the recently con-
cluded Protocol with Canada, the members will not
be entitled to treaty benefits. The plain language of
the Protocol does not prevent the entity from claim-
ing benefits, however. The entity must rely on Article
Ill(f) o  the treaty, which provides via definition that
"any entity which is treated as a body corporate for
tax purposes" is a person that may be a resident for
purposes of Article I (Personal Scope) and Article IV
(Residence). This result should be the same as that
reached under the Barbados, United Kingdom and
Japan treaties, although the Protocol's obtuse word-
ing leaves something to be desired from a business
planner's perspective.
2. Scenario 2-United States
Classifies the Entity As Opaque;
Treaty Partner Classifies the Entity
As Transparent
Code Sec. 894 Regulations. The entity is a foreign
reverse hybrid entity. While not specifically addressed
in the regulation, the logic of the theme governing
treaty benefits dictates that the entity is not eligible for




Diagram 6. Scenario 2
A B
parent by the Treaty Partner. However, the members
should qualify for treaty benefits, because the income
is "derived by a resident" of the Treaty Partner. Nev-
ertheless, some uncertainty arises as to the proper
resolution of the issue because the Regulation fails
to address the matter.
Barbados. The Barbados treaty produces a similar
result. Under Article 4, paragraph 1 (b), the entity is
noteligible for treaty benefits, because the income in
the entity's hands is not "subject to tax" by the Treaty
Partner. However, under the same provision, the
income is attributed to the members and is "subject
to tax" by the Treaty Partner. The members therefore
should qualify for treaty benefits. Once again, some
uncertainty would arise because the failure of the
regulations to address foreign reverse hybrids pre-
cludes their incorporation when determining the
proper treatment of the transaction.
United Kingdom. The same result should obtain
under Article 1, paragraph 8 of the United Kingdom
treaty. The income is "treated for the purposes of the
taxation law" of the members "as the income, profit
or gain of a resident," but the same is not true of the
entity. Thus, only the members may be eligible for
treaty benefits. As was the case with the Barbados
treaty, the failure of the regulations to address foreign
reverse hybrids limits the ability to integrate them in
resolving the issue.
Japan. The more specific provisions of the Ja-
pan treaty reach the same result produced by the
Barbados and United Kingdom treaties. Under
Article 4, paragraph 6(a) of the Japan treaty, the
entity is not eligible for treaty
benefits, because it is treated
C as fiscally transparent. How-
ever, the members qualify for
treaty benefits under para-
graph 6(c), because they are
residents and are subject to
tax on the U.S. source income.
zx Treaty Partner This is true even though the
United States treats the entity
United States as opaque. Furthermore, the
Saving Clause is inapplicable
because the enterprise was
formed in the foreign jurisdic-
tion. The treaty's specificity
eliminates the uncertainty oth-
erwise created by the absence
of coverage of foreign reverse
hybrids in the regulations.
Canada. Canada, as the county of residence, views
the entity as transparent, while the United States, as
the country of source, views it as opaque. Under
Article 2(6) of the new Protocol, the members of
the entity will be eligible to receive treaty benefits
so long as the entity is not a resident of the United
States.73 Finally, unlike the first scenario, it is clear
that the United States is not required to afford treaty
benefits to the entity itself, because the entity is not
otherwise considered to be a resident of Canada for
treaty purposes.
3. Scenario 3-United States
Classifies the Entity As Transparent;
Treaty Partner #1 Classifies the
Entity As Opaque; Treaty Partner #2
Classifies the Entity As Transparent
Code Sec. 894 Regulations. The entity is a foreign
regular hybrid entity. Under Reg. §1.894-1(d)(1),
and subject to the Limitation on Benefits Clause,
both the entity and some of its members are eligible
for benefits, because in both Treaty Country #1 and
Treaty Country #2, "the item of income is derived
by a resident." The country of formation regards the
entity as a resident, and the country of member C's
residence regards the member similarly. Importantly,
A and B would not be entitled to benefits as they are
not subject to tax on the income of Treaty Partner #1.
It is also significant that treaty benefits in this scenario
are governed by different treaties-the benefits avail-
able to the entity are governed by the convention
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with Treaty Partner #1, while the benefits available
to the members are governed by the convention with
Treaty Partner #2. Once again, the United States'
characterization of the entity is irrelevant.
Barbados. The general provision of Article 4, para-
graph 1 (b) of the Barbados treaty should grant benefits
to either the entity or its members, depending upon
which constitutes a resident of its jurisdiction. The
treaty language should encompass both, because the
income is subject to tax "either in [the entity's] hands
or in the hands of its partners or beneficiaries." In such
a case, where benefits are available to both an entity
and its members, the regulations under Code Sec.
1441 prohibit the duplication of benefits and address
their allocation among the eligible parties. These provi-
sions are discussed in greater detail below. Again, the
treatment of the entity in the United States is irrelevant.
Furthermore, integration of the principles of the Code
Sec. 894 regulations is available if needed.
United Kingdom. The same result obtains under
Article 1, paragraph 8 of the United Kingdom treaty
because the income "is treated for the purposes of the
taxation law of such Contracting State as the income,
profit or gain of a resident." The Technical Explana-
tion to the treaty ensures that, from the perspective of
the United States, the existence of a hybrid entity is
irrelevant and thus produces the results which would
arise under the regulations if needed.
Japan. If the provisions of the Japan treaty governed
this scenario, the entity and its members would be
eligible for treaty benefits. The entity qualifies for
benefits under Article 4, paragraph 6(b), while the
members qualify under Article
4, paragraph 6(c).74
Canada. As in Scenario 1,
the new Protocol with Canada
seems to deny treaty benefits
to members of the entity who
reside in Canada. 75 As in the
first scenario, however, the
entity itself may be eligible for
- Treaty Partner 41 benefits under the treaty's more
general provisions. Further-
1\ United States more, member C's eligibility is
not governed by the agreement
between the United States and
Canada; rather, it is governed
by the convention between the
United States and Treaty Partner
#2, which may be more forgiv-
ing than the Protocol. If the
entity is not a resident of the United States, Article
2(6) would seem to allow access to treaty benefits.
4. Scenario 4-United States
Classifies the Entity As Opaque;
Treaty Partner #1 Classifies the
Entity As Opaque, and Treaty Partner
#2 Classifies the Entity As Transparent
The analysis in this scenario is identical to that for
scenario 3, even though the United States now
treats the entity as opaque rather than transpar-
ent. Both the entity and some of its members will
be eligible for treaty benefits under the Barbados,
United Kingdom and Japan treaties and the Code
Sec. 894 regulations as discussed in scenario 3. In
addition, the result becomes more certain under the
Canada treaty. As between the United States and
Canada, the entity is not a hybrid, and the general
treaty provisions should provide benefits to the
entity. As in scenario 3, the Canadian members
need not be considered.
5. Scenario 5-United States
Classifies the Entity As Opaque;
Treaty Partner #1 Classifies the
Entity As Transparent
An exception to the general rule arises in a domestic
reverse hybrid situation, i.e., the United States treats
the entity as opaque, while the entity's and/or mem-
bers' country regards it as transparent.
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In this case, the entity is a corporation of the United
States. Thus, the United States is free to tax the entity's
income, even though the entity's members may also
be subject to tax on the same income in their country
of residence. This result arises from the Saving Clause
of the various treaties discussed above. The Saving
Clause of the Barbados treaty provides that "a Con-
tracting State may tax its residents, ... and by reason
of citizenship may tax its citizens, as if the Convention
had not come into effect."76 The United Kingdom,
Japan and Canada treaties function similarly.77 Finally,
the Code Sec. 894 regulations explicitly deny treaty
benefits for domestic reverse hybrids.78
6. Withholding Regulations for
Dual Treaty Benefits
In some of the above scenarios, both the entity
and some of its members are entitled to a reduced
Diagram 9. Scenario 5
A B C
---------- - --- ----------------
withholding rate under their
respective treaties. This raises
the question of which treaty ap-
plies, particularly when the two
treaties call for different rates of
withholding. The Treasury Regu-
lations provide guidance.79
#1 The basic rule is that only one
Treat Ptreaty-reduced rate may apply
I United States to a particular item (or portionof an item) of income. 0 A with-
holding agent cannot layer the
various reduced rates from all
applicable treaties on top of one
another.1 However, different
treaty withholding rates can be
applied to the respective por-
tions of the income received (or deemed received)
by each member, according to the rate stated in the
applicable treaty for each member's jurisdiction.82
In other words, a single payment to a foreign entity
may be divvied up and different withholding rates
applied to each portion.
Procedurally, if both an entity and a member
claim benefits for the same portion of the income,
the withholding agent may choose which rate to
apply.8 However, when a member is entitled to a
lower rate of withholding than is the entity to which
the payment is made, the member should request
this lower rate. In the event that the member is
"short-changed" by the withholding agent, it can
subsequently claim a refund or credit.84 Thus, in
a practical sense, the lowest rate of any relevant
treaty will ultimately apply to a particular portion
of an income item (although the rate initially ap-
plied by the withholding agent
may determine whether the
"extra" money ends up in the
Treaty Partner #1 hands of the entity or its mem-
--------------- bers).8 s Where no Limitation on
] United States Benefits Clause applies, this
rule potentially allows busi-
ness entities to benefit from
lenient tax treaties negotiated
by countries other than the
entity's host country. However,
a contrary rule would deny
members the full enjoyment of
tax treaties negotiated by their
own host countries.
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V. Conclusion
The United States' incorporation of hybrid entity lan-
guage into its tax treaties is beneficial because it brings
certainty to cross-border transactions. It draws clear
lines for IRS agents who must assess transactions in-
volving hybrid entities, and it obviates investors' need
to rely on the Code Sec. 894 regulations. The Code
Sec. 894 regulations provide for their application in
all treaty settings unless a treaty specifically addresses
the matter; thus, the "better of" (the treaty or domestic
law) approach is generally applicable with respect
to foreign investment in the United States. Although
consistent results should arise under this approach
unless a particular governing treaty specifically re-
jects the approach of the
regulations, the need for
treaty language addressing The United Sta
hybrid entities remains. of hybrid e
Because the United States
does not consistently fol- into its tax tre
low the OECD's lead on because it bri
international tax matters, cross-borde
investors in U.S. cross-
border transactions cannot
necessarily rely on the Partnership Report and OECD
Model Treaty explanation for guidance when inter-
preting older conventions. Furthermore, the Code
Sec. 894 regulations require both foreign and domes-
tic investors to look to foreign sources of law, which
may not be readily understandable, translatable or
even stable. As a result, while the Code Sec. 894
regulations function as an adequate backstop, they
cannot provide the same solid footing that results
from clear, modern, and understandable language
embodied in an applicable treaty. By incorporating
such language into the treaties themselves, the United
States can provide certainty to domestic and foreign
taxpayers who structure their investments through
such vehicles.
A second source of interpretive certainty has been
harmonization. The United States' focus on the
residence country's classification of hybrid entities
is aligned with the OECD approach and should
therefore be easily understandable to most foreign
investors. Furthermore, uniform adoption of the lan-
guage employed by the United Kingdom treaty or
the Japan treaty would allow taxpayers to consider
the administrative and judicial interpretations of U.S.
conventions with other treaty partners when planning






harmonization across treaties has already occurred
to an extent. Language similar to the hybrid entity
provision of the United Kingdom treaty appears in a
number of other agreements, including recently con-
cluded treaties or protocols with Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Belgium and Sweden.86
Still, even perfectly harmonized adoption of hybrid
provisions similar to the United Kingdom or Japan
treaties would not consistently achieve the ideal result
of one country taxing a particular item of income
only once. Problems of double taxation and double
nontaxation would still arise because treaty benefits
are based on tax jurisdiction, rather than actualtaxa-
tion. If an entity is "subject to tax" in a country that
chooses not to tax a particular item of income, that
income may escape taxa-
tion completely.87 Some
'incorporation commentators have sug-
ty language gested requiring actualtaxation as a prerequisitees is beneficial to treaty benefits, either
s certainty to in the Code Sec. 894
ransactions. regulations or the treaties
themselves. However, this
approach could result in
greater administrative difficulties, and it could also
weaken legitimate tax incentives offered to investors
by treaty partners.
Ultimately, it is the countries themselves that must
choose to exercise their tax jurisdiction. In some circum-
stances, countries might find that tax treaty provisions
are contrary to the national interest. For example, the
Dutch Secretary of Finance refused to enforce the new
United States-Netherlands tax treaty provision govern-
ing treaty eligibility of hybrid entities and their members
because its adoption posed a threat to foreign invest-
ment.8 In such a situation, no amount of harmonization
or clarification on the part of the United States can uni-
laterally achieve the treaty's stated goals of eliminating
both double taxation and fiscal evasion.
In the end, we must conclude that tax treaties oper-
ate in an inherently messy international landscape.
For now, it seems that United States treaty negotiators
have at least grasped the problems posed by hybrid
entities and are moving toward a sensible solution.
Recent tax treaties with Japan and the United King-
dom are in accord with the OECD approach and
should point the way toward more explicit provi-
sions regarding hybrid entities as the United States
renegotiates many of its older treaties. We applaud
the Japan treaty's specificity for its ease of use and its
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clear applicability and the United Kingdom treaty's an ideal future for treaty coverage, it would be that
broadly drafted provision for its ability to address all new treaties and most renegotiated treaties would
unanticipated business forms and transactions that specifically address hybrid entities as was done in
may arise in the future. In contrast to the provisions the Japan treaty, or as a close second, in the United
of the new Canada Protocol, which are inscrutable Kingdom treaty, and that these provisions would be
at first blush, the provisions of the Japan and United harmonized across treaty partners. In such harmo-
Kingdom treaties are detailed, readily decipherable, nization, we would anticipate certainty, and with
and in keeping with most other approaches to hybrid certainty, a better environment in which to conduct
entity treaty eligibility. Finally, if one were to predict international business.
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of citizenship may tax its citizens,





11 Roger Berner and Gregory May, The New
U.K.-U.S. Income Tax Treaty PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, Sept.-Nov. 2006.
52 Diplomatic Notes to U.S.-U.K. DoubleTaxa-
tion Convention (2001), with reference to
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14 United States-Japan Tax Treaty, Art. 4, para.
6(a):
(a) An item of income:
(i) derived from a Contracting
State through an entity that is or-
ganized in the other Contracting
State; and
(ii) treated as the income of the
beneficiaries, members or par-
ticipants of that entity under the
tax laws of that other Contracting
State;
shall be eligible for the benefits of the
Convention that would be granted if it
were directly derived by a beneficiary,
member or participant of that entity
who is a resident of that other Contract-
ing State, to the extent that such ben-
eficiaries, members or participants are
residents of that other Contracting State
and satisfy any other conditions speci-
fied in the Convention, without regard
to whether the income is treated as the
income of such beneficiaries, members
or participants under the tax laws of the
first-mentioned Contracting State.
s U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, Art. 4, para. 6(b):
(b) An item of income:
(i) derived from a Contracting
State through an entity that is or-
ganized in the other Contracting
State; and
(ii) treated as the income of that
entity under the tax laws of that
other Contracting State;
shall be eligible for the benefits of the
Convention that would be granted to a
resident of that other Contracting State,
without regard to whether the income
is treated as the income of the entity
under the tax laws of the first- men-
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is a resident of that other Contracting
State and satisfies any other conditions
specified in the Convention.
s6 U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, Art. 4, para. 6(c):
(c) An item of income:
(i) derived from a Contracting State
through an entity that is organized
in a state other than the Contract-
ing States; and
(ii) treated as the income of the
beneficiaries, members or par-
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ticipants of that entity under the
tax laws of the other Contracting
State;
shall be eligible for the benefits of the
Convention that would be granted if it
were directly derived by a beneficiary,
member or participant of that entity
who is a resident of that other Con-
tracting State, to the extent that such
beneficiaries, members or participants
are residents of that other Contracting
State and satisfy any other conditions
specified in the Convention, without
regard to whether the income is
treated as the income of such benefi-
ciaries, members or participants under
the tax laws of the first-mentioned
Contracting State or such state.
s U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, Art. 4, para. 6(d):
(d) An item of income:
(i) derived from a Contracting State
through an entity that is organized
in a state other than the Contract-
ing States; and
(ii) treated as the income of that
entity under the tax laws of the
other Contracting State;
shall not be eligible for the benefits of
the Convention.
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(i) derived from a Contracting State
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in that Contracting State; and
(ii) treated as the income of that
entity under the tax laws of the
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dent of that other State, but by reason
of the entity being treated as fiscally
transparent under the laws of the
first-mentioned State, the treatment
of the amount under the taxation
law of that State is not the same as its
treatment would be if that entity were
not treated as fiscally transparent
under the laws of that State.
70 Id., at Art.2(7)(b).
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States, as the Source Country, should grant
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of the Japan treaty, chosen to use five sce-
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11 See Protocol Amending the Convention
between the United States of America and
Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital (Sept. 26, 1980) as Amended
by The Protocols Done on 14 June 1983,
28 March 1984, 17 March 1995 and 29
July 1997 at 38, Art. 2(7)(a), available at
www. ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/
CanadaProtocolO7.pdf.
76 See Convention between the Barbados and
the United States of America for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, Art. 1(3) (1984).
7 See Convention between the Government
of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains,
Art. 1(4) (2001); Convention between the
Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains,
Art. 1 (4)(a) (2003); Convention between the
United States of America and Canada with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
(1980), Art. XXIX(2).
78 Reg. §1.894-1(d)(2)(i).






85 For examples, see Reg. §1.1441-6(b)(2)(iv).
86 Convention between the Government of
the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Kingdom of Denmark for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income (1999), Art. 4(1)(d);
Protocol Amending the Convention between
the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Sweden for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income (2005), Art. 1(6); Protocol
Amending the Convention between the
Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Fin-
land for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
(2006), Art. 1(6); Convention between the
Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Kingdom of Bel-
gium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income (2006), Art.
1(6); and Protocol Amending the Conven-
tion between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital and to Certain Other
Taxes (2007), Art. 1(7).
87 Of course, this problem is not unique to
hybrid entities but may also arise in other
cross-border transactional contexts.
88 See Ruben de Witt, Netherlands to Disre-
gards Hybrid Entity Provision for U.S. Inves-
tors, 2005 TNT 133-6. The relevant provi-
sion is Art. 6(e)(4) of the U.S.-Netherlands
Tax Protocol (2006).The provision is similar
to that in the United Kingdom treaty, and
like all current treaties, it pins eligibility for
treaty benefits to residency. The old U.S.-
Netherlands tax treaty did not contain a
hybrid entity provision, creating a number
of tax planning opportunities. Essentially,
the Secretary's decree will allow United
States members of Dutch partnerships
to enjoy treaty benefits, even though the
partnership is treated in the United States
as opaque (probably through a check-
the-box election). Thus, the members of
a Dutch enterprise will be able to benefit
from a reduced withholding rate and defer
the payment of tax, even though neither
they nor the partnership are subject to tax
in the United States-the very result that
the hybrid entity provision is designed to
avoid. The Secretary was concerned that
if the new treaty provision were enforced,
many U.S. investors, deprived of their pre-
vious advantageous tax treatment, would
withdraw their foreign investments from
the Netherlands.
There are six specific factors that
must be satisfied under this regula-
tion, and it is easy for a taxpayer
to make certain it is not within the
scope of these rules. However,
even without this new regulation,
the IRS has disallowed foreign tax
credits in years prior to the effective
date of the regulation in transac-
tions considered abusive by the
IRS.' Even though it is undisputed
that the taxpayer is legally liable
for the tax in these transactions
and, therefore, under the technical
taxpayer rule the taxpayer would
traditionally be allowed a credit
for the foreign income taxes paid,
the credits are disallowed. The ar-
guments made by the IRS include
Code Sec. 269 and economic
substance doctrines, but even a
good business purpose is appar-
ently not sufficient to preclude an
IRS challenge.9
Loss Surrender
The third development, and one
that surprised many taxpayers and
50
practitioners, was Proposed Reg.
§1.901 -2(e)(5)(iii). This regulation
deals with the surrender of losses
between members of a group.
A basic example would be USP
owns 100 percent of UK1 and
100 percent of UK2. UK1 has 300
of income. UK2 has 100 of loss.
Under the UK corporate income
tax system, UK2 can surrender the
100 loss to UK1 thereby reducing
the tax liability of UK1 . The ques-
tion addressed by Proposed Reg.
§1.901-2(e)(5)(iii) is whether tax
paid by UKI in the future may be
considered a voluntary payment
of tax because UK1 surrendered
the loss to another taxpayer in-
stead of retaining the loss to offset
its own future tax liability. In other
words, referring to the description
of the voluntary payment rule set
forth above, should UK] and UK2
be considered a single taxpayer, or
are there two taxpayers. If there
are two taxpayers, the question
is whether UK] has reasonably
interpreted and applied the laws
of the U.K. to reduce over time
its foreign income tax liability if it
has surrendered a loss to another
taxpayer. The implied conclusion
in the proposed regulation is that
UKI may not have reasonably
interpreted and applied the laws
of the U.K., much to the surprise
of many taxpayers.
Proposed Reg. §1.901-2(e)(5)
(iii) resolves the purported prob-
lem by treating a "U.S.-owned
group" as a single taxpayer.
Generally a U.S.-owned group
includes related entities, which
is based on an 80-percent or
more ownership threshold. Be-
cause of multiple issues that
have been identified by taxpay-
ers under this new voluntary
payment test, finalization of this




The technical taxpayer rule and vol-
untary payment rule have become
interrelated. The technical taxpayer
rule is evolving away from the basic
question of whether a taxpayer is
liable for tax as determined under
foreign law. Similarly, the voluntary
payment rule has evolved to the
point where it may apply to disal-
low a foreign tax credit even though
the taxpayer's liability for payment
of a foreign income tax under for-
eign law is undisputed and there is
a valid business purpose for paying
the tax. The abandonment of a me-
chanical rule leads to uncertainty
both for the IRS and taxpayers. If
a foreign income tax paid with
respect to a structured passive in-
vestment arrangement supported
by a valid business purpose is a
voluntary payment, and if surren-
dering a loss to an affiliate creates a
voluntary payment exposure, what
could be next?
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